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Abstract 
In ‘The evidence that evidence-based medicine omits’, Brendan Clarke and colleagues argue that 
when establishing causal facts in medicine, evidence of mechanisms ought to be included 
alongside evidence of correlation. One of the reasons they provide is that correlations can be 
spurious and generated by unknown confounding variables. A causal mechanism can provide a 
plausible explanation for the correlation, and the absence of such an explanation is an indication 
that the correlation is not causal. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) proponents remain sceptical 
about this argument, one problem being that the formulation of a mechanism requires 
judgements that are external to the evaluation of data and experimental designs - for instance 
judgements of plausibility against, or derivability from, background knowledge. Since background 
knowledge is always incomplete and therefore unreliable, EBM proponents maintain that the 
plausibility of a hypothesis should be evaluated mainly by the quality of population data that 
yielded it. Here, I use the example of oestrogen replacement therapy’s effect on coronary heart 
disease, an example that is often quoted in defence of the epistemic advantage of randomised 
controlled trials, to show that the evaluation of the most reliable study design necessarily implies 
the adoption of judgements that are external to the specific evidence of correlation. The 
exclusion of evidence of mechanism, therefore, is not effective in bypassing paradigm-dependent 
judgements, which are external to specific evidence. Since such judgements cannot be excluded 
by evidence evaluation, they can only be kept under scrutiny, or adopted uncritically. I propose 
that the latter option can hinder the maintenance of an active critical inquiry, as well as the 
analysis of experts’ disagreement 
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The approach to clinical practice proposed by the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement, 
has been a topic of debate during the last few decades. EBM is defined by its proponents as ‘the 
integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values’ to guide the 
clinical care of the single patient (1). While highlighting that evidence alone is insufficient to guide 
clinical decisions, this definition assigns nevertheless a crucial role to ‘the best research 
evidence’. However, there is debate on the kind of research evidence that best supports decision-
making in clinical practice. It is generally accepted that the establishment of statistical 
correlations through comparative population studies can be a powerful tool for detecting causal 
relationships in medicine. Older age (over 50) is correlated with an increased onset of colorectal 
cancer, for instance, which suggests a causal role of aging in the aetiology of this condition, and 
grounds the promotion of screening programs for this age group by some health care systems. 
However, it is also generally accepted that correlations are only indicators of causation, and thus 
can be fallible. In the previous example, age might not be a genuine cause of colorectal cancer, 
but just be associated with it because the two might be caused by common molecular changes. 
Even more problematically, correlations can be spurious, and be generated by unknown 
confounding variables. 
In presence of evidence of correlation, how should one evaluate whether it is a genuine or a 
spurious one? One strategy that has been supported by some scholars in philosophy of medicine 
is to look for evidence of a plausible mechanism underlying the correlation (2) (3). While there 
are several definitions of ‘mechanism’ available in the philosophical and medical literature, it is 
beyond the scope of this article to commit to any one particular definition. For my purposes here, 
it will be sufficient to generally define a mechanism as a causal process underlying the 
correlation. Evidence addressing a causal mechanism can include qualitative observations, 
laboratory experiments, investigations at the micro level, as well as existing statistical studies (4). 
The role of a causal mechanism is to provide a plausible explanation for the correlation, and the 
absence of such an explanation is an indication that the correlation is spurious (2). 
In tension with this argument, EBM frameworks rate evidence of correlations higher than the 
evidence of underlying mechanisms (5). That is to say, in the presence of high quality population 
studies, and therefore of reliable correlations, evidence of the mechanism underlying such 
correlations is not deemed as necessary for supporting decision making (6). Instead of collecting 
different types of evidence, EBM proponents aim to improve the reliability of a correlation by 
improving the quality of the population studies that yield it: 
 ‘…quality (tightly controlled, unbiased etc.) evidence rather than quantity of evidence 
helps reduce the likelihood of spuriousness.’ (6). 
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Why are EBM proponents sceptical about the reliance on causal mechanisms for establishing a 
causal relationship? One problem they wish to bypass can be illustrated as follows. Imagine that, 
for the formulation of a certain mechanism M, one needs three sets of specific data, for example, 
post-mortem histology, genotyping data, and cell-culture experiments. In order for these data to 
count as evidence for the specific mechanism M, they need to corroborate a number of related 
research hypotheses. In addition, the experimental design and methods used to collect and 
analyse the data ought to be both relevant and reliable. In the following, I will call specific 
evidence the set of data, together with the methods for data collection and analysis, which are 
used to directly test a specific hypothesis. Any other information will be called background 
knowledge. This includes more general evidence as well as theoretical understanding.  
However, the evaluation of data and experimental designs are not sufficient for the purpose of 
establishing M. First, the mechanism will not be established if it is not judged as ‘plausible’ based 
on background knowledge, which is external to the specific evidence. For instance, when 
investigating the mechanism underlying allergic reactions to a certain drug, the specific evidence 
will normally be interpreted in accordance with the basic knowledge about the physiology of the 
immune system. Such established knowledge is itself based on evidence, however this is a 
previously accumulated, general evidence, rather than a specific one, directly addressing the 
research question. This reliance on plausibility is problematic since background knowledge is 
always incomplete, and any judgement that leans on it is therefore unreliable. In multiple 
historical instances, based on commonly accepted background knowledge, the scientific 
community rejected the correct mechanism as implausible, or accepted the wrong mechanism 
as plausible (4). 
‘The apparent knowledge of what happens to some of the mechanisms under 
intervention lends an aura of acceptability, which, in turn, leads to more prolific use of a 
harmful effect’ (6, p.934) 
Second, the mechanism will not be established if it is not derived from within a more general 
understanding of phenomena, which is also external to the specific evidence. The formulation of 
the mechanism underlying a certain drug intervention, for example, requires an understanding 
of general mechanisms of drug metabolism. This is problematic for the same reason as above: 
such understanding is always incomplete: 
‘When it comes to drug therapy, mechanistic reasoning is bound to be based on ‘partial’ 
mechanisms because of the complexity and somewhat mysterious metabolic 
mechanism’ (7). 
We see, therefore, that the establishment of a causal mechanism, or explanation, requires 
additional judgements respects to the mere evaluation of the specific evidence (data and 
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experimental designs). These judgements are never entirely reliable, because they are based on 
background knowledge and general understanding of phenomena, which are always incomplete.  
In response to this, EBM frameworks recommend to rely preponderantly on evidence of 
correlations from population data, when making a causal claim (6). This recommendation can be 
motivated as follows (6, 7). While evidence of mechanism needs to be interpreted against fallible 
background knowledge and theoretical understanding, population data can be graded by simply 
evaluating the experimental design that generated them. This process still requires some theory 
(statistical theory, for instance). However, it largely circumvents the reliance on judgements that 
are external to the evidence of correlation available to test the specific hypothesis. Thus, 
evaluating the quality of a population study is comparatively a straightforward matter, since our 
understanding of what constitutes (for instance) a good statistical design is more reliable than 
our general understanding of biological phenomena. For this reason, according to the EBM 
framework, good evidence of correlation from population studies should be normally given 
priority over mechanistic evidence in medical decision making. 
In this paper, I argue that the strategy proposed by EBM, of relying preponderantly on 
correlations from population data, is not successful for the purpose of bypassing judgements that 
are external to the specific evidence. When the explanation underlying a certain correlation is 
left aside, the relative quality of population studies is proposed as the only tool in order to 
evaluate a casual hypothesis (6). This process, however, cannot be done by considering 
exclusively the population studies themselves; it is still reliant on external judgements based on 
background understanding of phenomena. The normative divergence, therefore, is not whether 
judgements external to the specific evidence ought to be included in medical decision making, 
but whether they ought to be kept under scrutiny or accepted uncritically (fig. 1). 
  
2.  Weighing evidence from different population studies 
At times, population studies yield correlations that contradict previous evidence or established 
theories. They might even contradict intuitions that are more fundamental than established 
theories. A randomised controlled trial (RCT), for instance, tested the effect of retroactive prayer 
on the length of hospitalization of 3400 patients and found a statistical significant effect of the 
‘treatment’ in the experimental group (8). The author’s motivation for this experiment was to 
show that a good experimental design is not a guarantee for unbiased results. In other words, 
the author adopts the fundamental assumption that instances of backward causation can never 
exist, therefore any result pointing to the opposite conclusion must be wrong. On the other hand, 
if one disregards the primitive role of basic assumptions, the results of such a study would give 
reasons to doubt the basic knowledge that the cause always precedes the effect.  Are 
correlations of this kind spurious, or do they indicate real causation? EBM proponents advise 
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caution in evaluating the plausibility of these hypotheses by looking for an explanatory causal 
mechanism based on current background knowledge. In other words, we should not rely on the 
fact that basic knowledge does not provide us with a plausible theory that would explain 
backward causation. We would risk repeating historical errors, in which relevant evidence was 
dismissed because at the time there was no established causal mechanism that could make sense 
of it. As an example, in the much quoted case of Dr. Semmelweis, evidence that antiseptic 
routines reduce infections at childbirth was rejected as implausible because there was no 
accepted understanding of how this could happen (9).  
How can such mistakes be avoided? Is there a strategy that allows to evaluate the spuriousness 
of a correlation, without relying on fallible mechanistic thinking? There is, according to EBM 
proponents. One can judge the plausibility of the hypothesis by evaluating the quality of the 
studies that yielded it. Howick 2011 states that it is possible to  
‘[…] evaluate the comparative clinical studies on their own grounds1. Implausible 
hypothesis are either true or false. If true we would expect consistent detectable effects 
in unbiased comparative clinical studies’ (6, p. 932, emphasis mine). 
It is the presence or absence of such effects, without the need of any explanation (and therefore 
without the need of any additional judgement than the evaluation of the study itself), that should 
guide our evaluation of the hypothesis.  Ideally then, postulates Howick, if unbiased comparable 
clinical studies showed consistently that retrospective prayer improves the healing of 
hospitalized patients, we ought to start believing that the cause can come after the effect, at 
least sometimes(6). 
‘If such consistent effects are demonstrated, then we should recall the Semmelweis case 
and temper our skepticism regarding the plausibility of the hypothesis’ (6, p. 932) 
In other words, the quality of the evidence alone is the most reliable benchmark to evaluate the 
likelihood of a hypothesis. 
This type of argumentation relies on the assumption that the evaluation of the relative strength 
of evidence, the quality of evidence and bias do not adopt judgements that are external to the 
specific evidence of correlation. Only under this assumption, indeed, can such evaluations be 
considered independent from background knowledge, explanations, and broader understanding 
of biological phenomena and therefore more reliable that mechanistic thinking. 
This assumption, I will argue, might hold in some simple cases of evidence evaluation, for instance 
when a trial with considerable statistical power stands against a previous small study. However, 
                                                          
1 By ‘on their own grounds’ the author means without the need of mechanistic reasoning. He defines mechanistic 
reasoning as ‘an inferential chain (or web) linking the intervention […] with a patient-relevant outcome, via 
relevant mechanism’. In other words, mechanistic reasoning is establishing causation by finding an explanation for 
why and how the outcome happens.  
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it cannot be generalized to evidence evaluation overall and therefore should not be taken as the 
default assumption. To demonstrate my claim, I will consider a renowned example within the 
EBM discourse: the case of oestrogen replacement therapy and its effect on coronary heart 
disease. 
Up until the 1990s, oestrogen therapy was widely prescribed to post-menopausal women 
because it was believed to protect them from coronary heart disease. Besides the existence of 
mechanistic evidence, this belief was supported by a considerable body of observational 
population studies. Although not all the observational evidence was consistent, much of it 
pointed to the same results. For instance,  15 internally controlled, medium and large prospective 
observational studies showed consistently that post-menopausal women receiving oestrogen 
replacement therapy had significantly less incidence of coronary heart disease than untreated 
patients (overall relative risk 0.50, confidence interval 0.43-0.56) (10). The confidence in 
oestrogen replacement therapy, however, was suspended when a large RCT showed the opposite 
result: treated patients had significantly increased risk of heart disease (estimated hazard ratio 
1.29, confidence interval 1.02-1.63) (11).This example is often quoted to demonstrate the 
epistemic advantage of RCTs over other types of evidence. However, it is circular to affirm that 
the RCT was considered superior because it yielded the ‘true’ result (6). In a weight-of-evidence 
approach, which considerations do we need to adopt in order to evaluate the RCT as the most 
reliable evidence? Let us consider three steps that are needed in order to evaluate the quality of 
the RCT against the existing body of evidence. 
  
A) Quality of the randomisation (known confounders). The EBM framework adopts the a priori 
assumption that causation is best detected by its capacity to make a difference. One method to 
test difference-making is to apply a potential causal factor to only one of two equivalent settings, 
so that the difference between the two outcomes can be attributed to the tested factor. The 
essential prerequisite is that the two settings - the experimental setting to which the tested 
causal factor is applied and the control setting that remains untreated - must be as similar as 
possible in order to circumvent problems such as causal over-determination and/or masking of 
the effect by unbalanced causal relevant factors (confounders). In order to meet this 
requirement, in a clinical trial the group of patients receiving the treatment must be as ‘similar’ 
as possible to the control group. This corresponds to saying that patient’s characteristics that are 
causally relevant for the outcome must be equally distributed among the two groups. 
In observational studies, the task of equally distributing the potentially relevant causal factors 
among the two groups is done by ‘matching’ the experimental and control group for the factors 
that one thinks might be significant. The clear problem with this strategy is that there is an 
indefinite number of unknown relevant factors, over which we have no control. This problem is 
supposedly taken care of by an alternative strategy, randomisation. The reasoning here is that if 
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one randomly assigns the patients to the two test groups a priori and the groups are large 
enough, then there is greater probability that more known and unknown confounders will be 
distributed evenly across the group, compared to observational studies (12). However, random 
allocation together with the law of large numbers is not per se sufficient reason to be confident 
that the study groups are more balanced than observational studies of otherwise comparable 
quality. At least not according to EBM textbooks. Sackett and colleagues do not take 
randomisation to be a guarantee for a high level of homogeneity without a so-called ‘baseline 
assessment’. This consists in a ‘double-check to see whether randomisation was effective by 
looking to see whether patients were similar at the start of the trial’ (12). If randomisation did 
not work properly, then it is necessary to re-randomise the participants. 
Verifying whether ‘patients are similar’ means double-checking whether experimental and 
control groups have a similar distribution of confounders that we suspect will be causally 
relevant, or factors that ‘potentially affect the outcome’ (7). What is to be accounted as 
potentially relevant factors change depending on the case at stake and, crucially, cannot be 
derived by the specific data of correlation themselves. On the contrary, it is a judgement based 
on a broader background understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny. In the Rossouw RCT, 
the baseline assessment included age, race, hormone use, body mass index, smoking, history of 
heart disease, treatment for diabetes, blood pressure, statins and aspirin use amongst other 
factors. As it should be clear, such selection of causally relevant factors is reliant on the available 
body of knowledge about heart disease aetiology. This body of knowledge (obviously) varies over 
time. In the 1970s, for example, it was already clear that heart disease was correlated with social 
class distribution, but by 1992 a partial explanation was offered for this correlation: different 
levels of education contributed to the level of cigarette smoking, blood pressure, and total 
cholesterol (13) (14). The evaluation of potentially relevant causal factors, therefore, would have 
been different at these two different time points. When evaluating whether randomisation was 
effective, hence the quality of the RCT, hence the most reliable result, one unavoidably adopts 
the contemporary advancement in understanding the related phenomena. 
  
 B) Quality of randomisation (unknown confounders). 
Although RCTs maintain a primary epistemic role in EBM, the original claim that a well-done RCT 
trumps observational evidence, no matter how good and how much of it (15), was harshly 
criticized (16). One problem is that although we verified that randomisation was effective for 
known confounders, we still cannot be sure about how it took care of all the unknown ones. As 
generally acknowledged (by EBM proponents as well), randomisation alone is not sufficient to 
assure that all confounding factors are equally distributed across groups, even when it 
guarantees high probability of balancing each single factor (7,8,17,18). Some scholars have even 
proposed that ‘there is good reason to doubt that the balance assumption [the assumption that 
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each potential confounding cause is distributed similarly among the study groups] is true for even 
one of our best RCTs’ (18). Is this a matter of concern? It could be if we endorse arguments 
defending that RCTs should control for all causally relevant factors (19). However, in the case at 
hand, we do not necessarily need to ensure that the Russow study controlled for all confounding 
factors, as long as we demonstrate that it controlled for more confounding factors than the 
previously available observational evidence. 
This, again, is hard to do by solely focusing on the study designs and results. By adhering to these 
elements, one can only observe that the Rossouw study, because it is randomised, is the only 
study that removes allocation biases, therefore it is, in principle, the study that has better 
chances of being the least biased. This speculation can be proven much more firmly, however, 
by adopting judgements external to the studies themselves. The same Howick 2011 provides us 
with an example of such judgements: 
‘…there are independent reasons to believe the results of the randomised trial […]. For 
example, the authors of the earlier studies observed that mortality due to homicide was 
higher among women who did not take HRT [oestrogen replacement]. This (among other 
similar observations) implied that there were potentially confounding differences 
between women who chose (or were chosen by their doctors) to take HRT and those who 
did not.’ (6, p. 932) 
What Howick suggests here, is to evaluate the observational studies by considering some of the 
correlations they yield and judge them by their plausibility against background knowledge, rather 
than by their statistical significance. We do not accept that oestrogen replacement protects 
women from death due to homicide. Rather, we accept that this correlation points out an 
imbalance in the study recruitment, whereby one of the groups had a higher number of women 
living in bad neighbourhoods, for instance. These considerations, however, would not be possible 
if we focused only on the study in isolation. In this case, indeed, we would only be allowed to 
consider, as benchmarks for the plausibility of the causal association, factors such as the degree 
of significance, and/or the magnitude of the effect. The bigger the latter two, the more plausible 
it would be that the correlation is not spurious. When external judgement (based on general 
understanding of biology) is instead adopted, the stronger one such correlation, the bigger the 
proof that the study is seriously biased. 
C) Analogy with existing population studies. 
One could argue that, although considerations external to specific evidence might be necessary 
for evaluating the relative strength of population studies, such considerations do not need to 
include theoretical – explanatory aspects. Specifically, the reliance on a study’s result can 
increase if the study is in line with other high quality population studies. For example, by the early 
1970s there was evidence that the administration of equine oestrogen did not protect men 
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against heart coronary disease. On the contrary, high doses of oestrogen were correlated with a 
higher incidence of the condition (20). These results, yielded by the large cohort ‘Coronary Drug 
Project’, were used as an argument for holding scepticism toward the positive outcomes of 
observational trials in women (21). This way, one could argue that every new population study 
might be evaluated in the context of previously existing high-level population studies. In other 
words, background knowledge might be limited to population data, and exclude fallible 
explanations. 
The trouble with this reasoning is that, although in principle it is possible to separate population 
studies from the general state of the pathophysiological understanding of phenomena, this is not 
a realistic account of how evidence evaluation actually happens. Evidence from population 
studies, like any other type of evidence, acquire different significance depending on 
the total body of knowledge already available. For instance, gender difference in coronary heart 
disease have been increasingly elucidated, disclosing different anatomy, different 
physiopathology, different response to therapy and gender-specific risk factors (22). While in the 
1990s the gender – specific outcome of a cardiovascular intervention might have been surprising, 
it is less surprising nowadays. Arguably therefore, the fact that oestrogen replacement did not 
protect men from heart conditions would be less persuasive as an argument for scepticism 
toward the positive effect in women. By drawing on background knowledge, judgements external 
to the specific evidence also draw on explanatory, theoretical understanding of phenomena. 
In summary, I have considered the case of oestrogen replacement therapy and coronary heart 
disease, in which population studies of comparable statistical power, but with different 
experimental design, yielded conflicting results. When referring to this and similar examples, 
EBM proponents urge that the quest of an explanatory mechanism by which oestrogen might 
protect from heart disease, or on the contrary provoke it, should not have a decisive role in the 
evaluation or total evidence. On the contrary, they suggest, the evaluation of the most reliable 
result ought to exclude judgements that are external to the population studies themselves. In 
this section, I have argued that the evaluation of which experimental design was to be considered 
the most reliable, and therefore which result ought to be taken as ‘true’, inherently implies the 
use of judgements that are external to the specific population studies. Indeed, in order to justify 
the epistemic advantage of the randomised study, one needs to be confident in the fact that 
randomisation worked. This, as I suggested, cannot be done with the use of specific evidence 
alone, but drawing on background knowledge and the understanding of phenomena. The 
strategy of limiting evidence to correlations from population studies, therefore, is not effective 





If judgements that are external to the specific evidence are inherently built into the evaluation 
of conflicting results, one cannot decide whether or not to include them in medical decision-
making. The choice is rather between keeping them under scrutiny, or accepting them 
uncritically. 
EBM’s high reliance on population studies ‘on their own’, and the low epistemic status left for 
explanatory mechanisms, conveys the false impression that specific evidence alone can guide us 
toward the ‘correct’ evaluation, and ultimately toward the right decision. There are some risks, 
or at least some disadvantages, in promoting such a belief on the supremacy of data. For one, it 
is not uncommon that good data lead to the wrong answer. For instance, much evidence in the 
1970s led the scientific community to wrongly accept herpes virus (HSV) as the cause of cervical 
cancer (4). In a study on 40.000 screened patients, HSV was strongly correlated with malignant 
changes of the cervical epithelium (23). Cervical dysplasia was correlated with HSV2 
infections (24). Antibodies against HSV2 were present four times as often in women with cervical 
cancer as controls (25). Fragments of HSV DNA could be directly detected in cervical cancer 
cells (26). Other types of herpes viruses were also implicated in other types of cancer (4). The 
wrong causal connection between HSV and the aetiology of cervical cancer was dominant until 
the mid-1980s. Only then, did the role of papilloma virus start to become evident. 
This and a plethora of similar stories highlight that in order to maintain active the critical inquiry, 
any evidence needs to be met with scepticism, rather than belief (27). This becomes somewhat 
harder, under the illusion of a completely objective, data-driven analysis. On the contrary, if all 
types of judgements used in evidence evaluation are kept under scrutiny, it becomes easier to 
suspend belief. 
Another problem with the illusion of a paradigm-free evidence evaluation is that it leaves us with 
no tools to understand cases of expert disagreement, in which different evaluations are drawn 
from the same evidence (28). There is rarely a straight forward path to decision making that is 
paved by the perfect data. Studies often yield conflicting results and have strengths and 
weaknesses that need to be weighed against each other - a process that necessitates expert’s 
judgement. 
Consider one example that has been increasingly visible in the last few years. The correlation 
between exposure to the herbicide glyphosate and the onset of some types of cancer, including 
non-Hodgkin lymphoma, was tested with a number of population studies. Three of these 
investigations are unanimously considered ‘key studies’ by different evaluating agencies because 
of large numbers and high statistical power (29). However, all these studies are also unanimously 
acknowledged to have weaknesses: low number of exposed cases, potentially unadjusted 
exposure to other pesticides, and possible biases in assessing the exposure (29). Two of these 
three studies are retrospective pooled analyses of case-control studies, one performed across 
Canada, and the other in the mid-west US (30,31). The specific advantage of these two studies is 
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that they control for confounding by other pesticides using a sophisticated statistical analysis. 
Both studies showed a positive correlation between exposure to glyphosate and the onset of 
non-Hodgkin lymphoma, while indeed controlling for several confounding exposures (32). 
However, it is generally acknowledged that such study design is prone to recall biases, since it is 
retrospective. On the other hand, a relatively large cohort study, the Agricultural Health Study 
(AHS), showed no statistical significant association between exposure to glyphosate and the 
onset of non-Hodgkin lymphoma, with no apparent exposure–response relationship in the 
results (33). There are potential advantages of cohort versus case-control studies: the cohort 
study is a prospective study and is hence free from recall biases. Despite this potential advantage, 
in this case the follow-up period was limited to less than a decade, which is considered an 
insufficient time frame for the onset of the lymphoma, at least according to the current 
understanding of this type of cancer (29). 
As often happens, different agencies evaluated this epidemiological evidence in different ways. 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), for instance, considered the cohort AHS study as the 
best epidemiological evidence available, as it is the only one that was able control recall biases. 
Accordingly, EFSA’s verdict is that epidemiological data give ‘very limited evidence’ for an 
association between glyphosate – based formulations and non-Hodgkin lymphoma, ‘overall 
inconclusive for a causal or clear associative relationship’ (34). The International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC), on the contrary, evaluated the two case-control studies as more 
reliable than the cohort study, one of the motivations being that ‘the median follow-up time in 
the AHS was 6.7 years, which is unlikely to be long enough to account for cancer latency’ (29). 
Consequently, IARC concludes that ‘a positive association has been observed’, although ‘chance, 
bias or confounding could not be ruled out with reasonable confidence’ (32, emphasis mine). This 
difference in evaluation is not as minimal as it seems. IARC, indeed, urges that ‘legitimate public 
health concerns arise when causality is credible’ (29), while EFSA finds no reason for such public 
concern (35). 
If we focus solely on the population studies and the experimental designs, we are left with little 
ground to understand the foundations of this disagreement. Indeed, all agencies agree about 
what the strength and weaknesses of each experiment are. What changes from agency to agency 
is the evaluation of the relevance of such strength and weaknesses in relation to the current 
knowledge advance on cancer aetiology (for instance, when considering the length of follow up). 
Moreover, there is arguably a different value judgement of whether a potential false positive due 
to re-collection biases is preferable to a possible false negative due to insufficient study duration. 
The glyphosate case is at the moment an open controversy, showing once more that the mere 
evaluation of studies ‘on their own grounds’ poorly applies to the complex realm of health 
sciences. Overall, the proposition of a weight-of-evidence process, driven by population studies 
and excluding external judgements, seems more an ideal abstraction than a concrete solution. 
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In summary, I argued in favour of a pluralistic approach to causal evidencing in medicine. My 
argument in line with other stances advocating that both evidence of correlations and 
explanatory evidence are necessary for successful decision-making (2-4). I allow that, in some 
cases, good evidence from population studies can license a causal inference. The crucial point, 
however, is how one should assess that such evidence is ‘good’, or ‘better’ than evidence from 
other population studies, which might point to different conclusions. I showed a case in which 
such judgement presupposes theories of mechanisms. Arguably, this is representative for many 
other complex cases of causal inference. However, even assuming that my conclusion cannot be 
extended to the majority of evaluations of statistical evidence, it still shows how a rigid 
interpretation of EBM evidence hierarchy is problematic. Finally, I fully acknowledge that 
explanations can be wrong, and consequently can hinder the correct causal inference. However, 
since, as I argued here, such explanations are irreducibly embedded in the medical sciences, I see 
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